PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND SECONDARY
TRANSACTIONS: THE WHEAT REPORT
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
HUGH L. SOWARDS*

The Securities Acts Amendments of 19641 have been described

as "the most significant statutory advance in federal securities
regulation and investor protection since 1940 ..

*"2

Of practical

importance to attorneys serving corporate clients was the fact that,
for the first time, many of those clients were subjected to the
registration and reporting requirements of the federal securities
laws. 3 A major objective of the 1964 Amendments was "to afford
investors in publicly-held companies whose securities are traded
over-the-counter the same fundamental disclosure protections as
have been provided to investors in companies whose securities are
4
listed on an exchange."
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.S. 1941, Trinity College; LL.B. 1946, Yale
University.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d,78c(Supp. IV, 1969).
2. SEC News Digest No. 64-9-9 (Sept. 14, 1964).
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a-aa (1964) [hereinafted cited as the 1933 Act];
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964) [hereinafter cited as the 1934
Act].
Until 1964, registration and reporting protection afforded by sections 12 and 13 of the 1934
Act was available only to persons who owned securities registered on a national securities
exchange. Companies whose securities had not been registered under the 1933 Act but which
were traded in the over-the-counter market were not subject to the registration and reporting
requirements of sections 12 and 13. Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, enacted in 1936, did provide
'that under certain circumstances the reporting requirements of section 13 were applicable to
unlisted companies which filed registration statements under the 1933 Act. These so-called
"15(d) companies" and their status under the reporting requirements provided investor
protection in the over-the-counter market on a fragmentary basis only.
Enactment of the 1964 Amendments provided in effect that companies whose securities are
registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act are subject to the periodic reporting
requirements of section 13, by the filing of such Forms as 8-K, 9-K, and 10-K, and the proxy
rules under section 14. In this connection, companies whose securities must be registered under
section 12 are (1) companies whose securities are listed on national securities exchanges, and
(2) companies engaged in interstate commerce, having total assets exceeding $1 million and a
class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more persons. In addition to these
companies, certain other companies are subject to the periodic reporting, but not to the proxy,
requirements of section 14. These companies include issuers that have filed a registration
statement which has become effective under the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (Supp. IV, 1969).
4. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., IstSess. 9-10 (1963). "There is no convincing reason why
the comprehensive scheme of disclosure that affords protection to investors in the exchange
markets should not also apply to the over-the-counter market . . . .The public should not
be asked to buy and sell in darkness." Id.
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This elimination of the double standards of disclosure for listed
and unlisted companies has made it practicable for the Securities
and Exchange Commission to re-examine its disclosure policies and
to increase investor protection significantly through its rule-making
power within the framework of existing legislation. The Commission is currently doing exactly that by implementing some
of the recommendations made in the Wheat Report.5 Adoption of
these recommendations will represent sweeping changes from the
standpoint of securities attorneys and the advice they give to
corporate and individual clients, especially in that area of securities
regulation concerned with private placements and secondary
transactions.
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND SECONDARY TRANSACTIONS

A central feature of the Wheat Report is its attempt to extend
maximum protection to investors in the trading markets through
closer coordination between the disclosure requirements of the 1933
and 1934 Acts.' The heart of the Report is concerned with secondary
transactions by persons who acquired their securities in non-public
transactions.' More particularly, the Report seeks to achieve a
greater degree of certainty and predictability with respect to when
5. STAFF, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (1969)

[hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT]. The Commission release implementing that segment ol
the Report dealing with private placements and secondary transactions is Securities Act Re.
lease No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969). For a general discussion of the Wheat Report, see Sowards,
The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal Securities Regulation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 495
(1970).
6. See Wheat, The DisclosurePolicy Study oftheSEC, 24 Bus. LAW. 33 (1968).
7. WHEAT REPORT ch. VI. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail the
existing criteria for distinguishing between public and private offerings. The main point, of
course, is that if private purchasers are merely conduits and take "with a view to distribution"
within the meaning of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act, they are statutory "underwriters."
Moreover, the issuing company in such instances is exposed to the risk of violation of the
registration requirements of the Act with attendant civil liabilities. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962). Leading cases setting forth criteria for determining the public
or private character of the offering include SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953);
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Sherwood,
175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962)
(discussing four principal factors: (I) the number of offerees and their relationship to each
other and the issuer, (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering; (4) the type
and manner of the offering); C. ISRAELS, SEC PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 30-31 (1962); Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazardsfor the
Unwary, 45 VA. L. REV. 869 (1959).
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registration under the 1933 Act is required for resale of securities

acquired in private offerings. Broadly stated, this objective is
accomplished by the commendable. recommendation, long overdue,
that existing subjective tests used by the Commission governing
resale of such securities be replaced by objective tests. Put another
way, under the rules proposed by the Report, which, if adopted, will
take effect prospectively, the private purchaser's "inner thoughts"
would no longer be a factor in a later attempt to ascertain his
"investment intent" at the time of acquisition. The mirror of his
mind as reflected by such nonsensical criteria as a subsequent change
in his circumstances and "fungibility" would be discarded and
replaced by the practical and workable tests of time of holding and,
in certain instances, by the number and identity of the private
holders.
In recommending this substitution of objective for subjective
criteria, the Report emphasizes that investor protection can be
attained only if distinctions are made between reporting and nonreporting companies. This stems from the premise that investors in
the trading markets can make better informed investment decisions
if the securities to be bought or sold are those of companies subject
to the 1934 Act registration and reporting requirements. They need
not "buy and sell in darkness," 8 for current information would be
available to them under improved reporting requirements providing
for continuing sources of disclosure.'
It is a familiar principle of securities law that when John Jones,
an ordinary investor, sells 100 shares of ABC, Inc. to Sam Smith,
the public sale is an exempted transaction under section 4(l) of the
1933 Act, for the reason that Jones is not an "issuer,"
"underwriter," or "dealer" as those terms are used in section 2 of
that Act. Accordingly, no registration of Jones' shares is necessary.
Similai.y, when Jones is a control person with respect to ABC, Inc.,
his sale to Smith may be an exempted transaction under sections
4(1), 3(a)(l 1) (intrastate offering), or 3(b) (Regulation A offering). 10
8. See note4 supra and accompanying text.
9. "The phrase 'improvement in '34 Act reporting' has at least three aspects: (1) more
comprehensive reporting forms, (2) better administration and enforcement of requirements

relating to the preparation and filing of such forms, and (3) better dissemination of the
information contained in such forms." WHEAT REPORT 328.
10. Absent some exemption, secondary distributions by controlling shareholders who sell
through brokers in the open market must be registered. But section 4(4) as implemented by
rule 154 may permit a controlling person to dispose of a portion of his shares on the open
market within certain limitations. In the Ira Haupi case approximately 93,000 shares were
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Absent these exemptions, however, Jones, whether he is a control
person or even an ordinary seller, may have registration problems.
These problems are largely due to uncertainty of the application of
the Commission's rules and inconsistencies in their interpretation by
the Commission's staff. The Wheat Report frankly admits the
existence of this undesirable state of affairs and seeks to rectify it.
In striving to dispel existing confusion concerning resale of
securities acquired in private placements, the draftsmen of the
Report have wisely proposed the adoption of objective standards and
their application to secondary transactions by controlling and noncontrolling persons.
THE NON-CONTROL SHAREHOLDER: EXISTING STATUS

The non-control shareholder who purchases his shares in a
private offering is locked in. Indeed, this is one of the necessary
criteria for availability of the section 4(2) exemption under which he
purchased." But for how long is he locked in? There has never been
an unequivocal answer to this question. "The length of time,"
observed the Commission, "is merely one evidentiary fact to be
considered."' 12 In short, no honest reply may be given to the
understandable query of "How long do I have to hold?" Moreover,
avenues of escape are usually, and properly, impeded. The attorney
for the issuing company knbws that if the private purchaser actually
takes with a view to distribution he becomes a statutory underwriter
and may subject the'company to loss of its private offering
exemption.13 Accordingly, at the time of acquisition, he wili usually
insist upon an investment letter, a restridtive legend on the stock
certificate, and the placing of a stop-transfer order against the
sold by controlling shareholders through a broker. The holding in that case was to the effect
that a broker making a distribution for a controlling shareholder acts as an underwriter and
thus is not entitled to the exemption in section 4(4) for brokers' transactions.. Ira Haupt, 23
S.E.C. 589 (1946). In the Haupt case the Commission took the position that section 4(4) was
intended to distinguish between "trading" (exempt) and "distribution" (non-exempt)
transactions. But the Haupt case left unanswered the question of when a broker was acting
as a broker and when he was acting as an underwriter. It was for this reason that rule 154
was adopted. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan: 21, 1968); SEC Securities Act
Release No.4669 (Feb. 17, 1964).
11. See note 7supra.
12. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). "Of course, the longer the period
of retention, the more persuasive would be the argument that the resale is not at variance with
an original investment intent. . .. " Id.
13. See note7 supra.
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shares. Even after the passage of an appreciable period of time,
absent an agreement with the company to register his shares, the
private purchaser may not resell at the current market price unless
he can find his own exemption and unless counsel for the company
agrees that such an exemption is available. If he cannot convince
company counsel of the availability of an exemption, he may
nevertheless seek to obtain a no-action letter from the Commission.
Failing to obtain a no-action letter, he is faced with the Hobson's
choice of holding his shares for an additional indefinite period or
selling them at a sacrifice to another private purchaser. The
prospective purchaser of "letter stock" knows that he will be locked
in for an uncertain period of time. Moreover, he cannot "tack" the
length of time his seller held with that of his own; the holding period
starts to run again. All this adds up to a substantial discount from
the current market 'price when the private purchaser resells.' 4 But of
even greater significance from an economic standpoint, the
uncertainty surrounding the marketability status of shares purchased
in private placements may lead to an unwillingness to supply venture
capital to new enterprises. One who gets in on.the ground floor may
find himself in the cellar rather than in the penthouse. The game
may not be worth the candle. But the point is that it should be; there
is no sound reason why seed money cannot be supplied with the
assurance that the shares given in exchange will appreciate in value
if the company prospers and, more important, that the supplier of
such venture capital can turn such shares into dollar bills at a
predetermined time. This desirable result can and should be
accomplished within the existing framework of federal securities
regulation without sacrificing investor protection.
THE NON-CONTROL SHAREHOLDER AND PROPOSED REFORMS

The Wheat Report proposals would improve the status of the
non-control shareholder who acquires shares in a private offering in
two principal respects: a definite holding period is established and a
specific manner of resale is prescribed. 5 In this connection, however,
14. "[D]iscounts have been running from 35% to 50% in many instances ....
Indeed, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, noting the illiquidity of unregistered shares, recently
clamped a 10% lid on the amount open-end mutual funds-those that must stand ready to
redeem their shares-may hold." The Wall St. Journal, Nov. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 6. See also
Fund of Letters, Inc., SEC Registration No. 2-28515 (1968).
IS. See WHEAT REPORT 189-205.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:515

both the length of the holding period and the manner of resale are
largely dependent upon whether the acquired shares are those of a
company subject to the registration and reporting requirements of
the 1934 Act." As indicated previously, this distinction is based on
the premise that purchasers of securities in a reporting company
have current information available to them and thus have a better
opportunity to make an informed investment decision."
The Non-control Shareholder'sStatus in a Reporting Company
Suppose that John Jones purchases his securities in a private
offering from C Corporation, a reporting company." The Wheat
Report's proposed rules would permit him to sell these securities
without registration after one year in limited quantities at specified
times." More particularly, if Jones has not purchased any other C
Corporation shares in a private offering during that year, he may
sell under what are substantially the conditions provided in existing
rule 154, the so-called "one percent rule." 2
An analysis of the reasons behind the proposed rules permitting
limited sales of Jones' shares reveals, first, that those shares would
be "restricted securities"-securities acquired from the company or
a control person "in a transaction or chain of transactions none of
which was a public offering ....

."I'

Second, when Jones sells his

shares of C Corporation to Smith, he is not engaged in a
"distribution" within the meaning of the proposed rules.2 In sum,
although Jones, a non-control shareholder in a reporting company,
holds restricted securities even after the running of the one-year
period, he is not engaged in a distribution if he sells in unsolicited
brokerage transactions under a "one percent" limitation in any sixmonth period.2
16. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.

17. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
18. See proposed rule 164. The proposed rules are contained in SEC Securities Act Release
No.4997 (Sept. 15, 1969).
19. Proposed rule 162(a) & (c).
20. Id.
21. Proposed rule 161(a).
22. Proposed rule 162(a).

23. See WHEAr REPORT 230-32 & n.62. Furthermore, Jones may sell in successive six-month
periods. Id. at 230. Proposed rule 162 should be read in conjunction with proposed rule 160
(underwriters) and proposed rule 163 (providing in effect that only securities of those
companies on the "qualified list" may be publicly sold in limited quantities pursuant to
proposed rule 162). It should also be noted that Jones has not privately purchased any other
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Why, one may ask, should Jones not be permitted to sell all of
his shares after one year? If Jones holds stock in a company with a
large number of shares issued and outstanding, the question may be
academic, for in all probability he can sell all of his holdings in the
first six-month period by selling one percent of the company's
outstanding shares. But suppose that there is a relatively small
number of shares outstanding. Now he may be unable to sell out for
a protracted period of time. Or suppose that he does not want to
sell at the end of one year because of a falling market. In short, why
should non-control shareholders be subjected to such risks and
penalties? After all, under the "improved reporting requirements"
advocated by the Report, current information on the company
would be available to prospective purchasers. That, coupled with the
fact that in most instances the non-control shareholder wishes to
dispose of a relatively small amount of shares, means that the
proposed rules might place an undue burden on small shareholders
when investor protection is not jeopardized. It is submitted that it
would be preferable to permit the non-control shareholder to sell all
of his shares at the end of a specified but reasonably short time; for
example, the holding period could be increased to two years.
The Non-control Shareholder'sStatus in a Non-reportingCompany
Assume that Jones is a non-control shareholder of C
Corporation, a company not subject to the reporting requirements
of *the 1934 Act. The proposed rules would require him to hold for
five consecutive years during each of which years C Corporation has
had gross revenues from its operations of at least $250,000 but is
not subject to the reporting requirements during that time. If at the
end of the five-year period Jones has not privat ely purchased any
other C Corporation shares, he is free to sell all of his securities
without registration."
C Corporation shares during the one-year holding period. Otherwise, he could evade the one
percent limitation by commingling successive purchases. In effect, then, the proposed rules
would retain the "fungibility" doctrine in this respect. Finally, "tacking" is permitted where
Jones acquires his restricted securities as the result of a death, bona fide gift, pledge, stock
dividend, stock split, or recapitalization. Proposed rule 162(c) (3)-(5).
24. Proposed rule 161(b) provides that securities cease to be restricted after such five-year

period. Moreover, since Jones is not disposing of a restricted security, he cannot be an
'underwriter" within the meaning of proposed rule 160.
Economic implications merit examination when "restricted securities" cease to be
restricted, whether the prospective seller is a controlling or a non-controlling person. As
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Some questions immediately come to mind. Why was the longer
five-year period selected? In other words, why should the fact that
Jones is a shareholder in a non-reporting company require him to
hold his shares for an additional four years before he is free to sell
in the open market without registration? The obvious implication is
that in the case of a non-reporting company Jones' purchaser lacks
the protection of accessible information. Indeed, throughout the
Report sharp distinctions have been drawn between reporting and
non-reporting companies.? In view of this fact, one is tempted to
predict that many companies, in order to benefit all of their
shareholders, will voluntarily become reporting companies even
though they are not subject to the reporting requirements. In this
connection, the 1934 Act provides that such companies may become
reporting companies if they elect to do so, 26 "a process involving the
filing of form 10, a relatively uncomplicated item-and-answer
document. By this simple expedient the distinctions, and attendant
disadvantages, can be avoided. But, after all, this is probably one of
the real reasons underlying the Report's distinction: more companies
will find it advantageous to become reporting companies;
consequently, more information will become available to investors in
the trading markets.
It will be recalled that securities do not automatically cease to
be "restricted securities" after five years. Proposed rule 161(b) also
requires minimum annual gross revenues from operations of
$250,000 during each of those five years. This requirement may be
criticized on the ground that even a successful corner drugstore may
produce $250,000 in yearly gross revenues, but of course the reason
for the requirement is to prevent evasion of the rule through the use
of a "shell" corporation and thus to ensure that the company has
had a bona fide operating business during the holding period.28 In
addition, the gross revenue qualification has been criticized in that
previously pointed out, restricted shares now sell at substantial discounts in the open market.
See note 14 supra and acpompanying text. But as the shares become "seasoned" and the time
for cessation of the restriction approaches, the discount should lessen accordingly, for
prospective purchasers will know that the shares will soon become freely tradeable at the same
price as other shares of the company already being traded on the open market.
25. See. e.g., WHEAT REPORT 182-83,206-15.
26. "Any issuer may register any class of equity security not required to be registered
.. "Securities Exchange Act § 12(g)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1964).
27. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969).
28. WHEAT REPORT 203.
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a company's failure to meet the minimum figure may not be
"compatible with any sound theory of statutory interpretation of the
term 'distribution.' "2
STATUS OF THE CONTROLLING PERSON IN REPORTING AND NONREPORTING COMPANIES AT PRESENT AND UNDER THE PROPOSED

RULES

It is a fundamental principle of securities regulation that, unless
some exemption is available, shares owned by a person in a control
relationship with the company must be registered prior to sale ° The
last sentence of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act contains the following
language: "the term 'issuer' shall include, in addition to an issuer,
any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the
issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with
the issuer." 3' Pursuant to this provision, a person in a control
relationship with an issuer is an issuer but solely for the purpose of
making an "underwriter" persons who purchase from or sell for
such "issuer" in connection with a distribution.32 Furthermore, a
broker who sells for a controlling person in connection with a
distribution is acting as an underwriter rather than as a broker.
Consequently, the sales on behalf of the controlling person are not
"brokers' transactions" and, therefore, are not exempted under
section 4(4) and rule 154 promulgated thereunder.33 Thus, an
investment banker who arranges with a controlling person for a
29. Throop, FederalRegulation of Securities Committee Comments on the Wheat Report,

25 Bus. LAw. 39, 48 (1969). "1 cannot believe that an effective rule could not be drawn which
would make the five-year cut-off unavailable where the alleged private placement is shown to

be merely the initial step in a planned ultimate public distribution" Id. at49.
30. See, e.g., Skiatron Electronics &Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236 (1960); S.T. Jackson
& Co., 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950).

31. Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1964).
32. As indicated, this provision is limited to the purpose of defining an underwriter. Thus,
although a person who purchases securities from one controlling or controlled by the issuer
with a view to distribution will be an underwriter, the control person is not an issuer for the
purpose of an exemption under section 3(a)(l) or section 4(2) or for the purpose of signing a
registration statement. Similarly, if the person in control is a corporation, sales by its officers
and directors or agents performing similar functions would be sales by the corporation and

no underwriter would be involved. However, a person employed by the controlling corporation
for the special purpose of effecting the distribution would be considered an underwriter. See
American Gyro Corp., 1 S.E.C. 83, 93 (1935); rule 152A, Securities Act of 1933, 17
C.F.R. § 230.152a (1970); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4470 (Mar. 22, 1962) (sale of

fractional shares).
33. Rule 154, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1970).
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public sale of securities is an underwriter. Additionally, if the
securities are not registered, the broker will have violated the
registration provisions of section 5, and the controlling person will
have been exposed to liability under the federal statute prohibiting
aiding and abetting. 3 But, despite the principles set forth in the
foregoing discussion, the controlling person may have avenues of
escape open to him.3s
Under the rules proposed by the Wheat Report, a person's status
with respect to the public sale of securities acquired in a private
transaction may be largely dependent upon whether he is a
controlling person. The concept of control has given rise to one of
the most troublesome aspects of the entire field of securities
regulation. The 1933 Act contains no meaningful definition of
"control."u The very fact that the term has caused such confusion
in the legal and business communities would seem to have warranted
a thorough treatment of the matter in the Wheat Report. Therefore
it is disappointing that the draftsmen devote only five pages to a
discussion of this problem.37 But what is even more disappointing is
the negative approach used by the draftsmen in their attempt to find
a workable solution. In effect, they have proposed a rule that
attempts to define control as used in section 2(11) by specifying
persons who are not to be considered as in control of the issuing
corporation. 38 Although a detailed treatment of the concept of
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1964). Apparently one situation where it may make a difference
whether the controlling person has violated section 5 himself or has aided and abetted its
violation is where unusual circumstances make it more advantageous to proceed against the
controlling person alone without joining the broker-underwriter. See United States v. Wolfson,
405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969).
35. Private placements by the control person (section 4(l)); the intrastate exemption (section
3(a)(l1)); Regulation A ($100,000 each 12 months, or one of the other regulations under
section 3(b)); section 4(1) as the result of the "brokers' transactions" exemption under section
4(4), in the sense that the selling control shareholder is indirectly protected by rule 154 in the
event that no distribution is in progress; rules 133(d) and (e) (securities acquired in business
combinations).
36. Rule 405, Securities Act of 1933: "The term 'control' (including the terms 'controlling',
'controlled by', and 'under common control with') means the possession, direct or indirect,
of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise." 17
C.F.R. § 230.405 (1970). See also rule 410, Securities Act of 1933 (providing for existence
of disclaimer of control), 17 C.F.R. § 230.410 (1970). These rules serve as little more than
general guidelines to the meaning of the term in actual situations.
37. WHA T REPORT 158-59, 245-47.
38. WHEAT REPORT app. VI-l, at 7 (proposed rule 160). In fairness it should be stated that
a note to this rule contains the following language: "This rule is not intended to imply that
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control is beyond the scope of this article,3 the writer is aware that
the existence of control may be dependent upon share ownership,
family and business ties, contractual relationships, and a host of
other factors. 0 Moreover, it may be difficult to list meaningful
criteria in objective terms.4 1 However, it is submitted that the
difficulty is not insurmountable. A logical argument can be made for
establishing control criteria in an affirmative manner, depending
upon such factors as the number of shares outstanding, the character
of trading in those shares, and the identity of the trader. Different
and realistic limitations could then be applied to each criterion. In
short, there is no convincing reason why control should not be stated
in affirmative as well as objective terms. Such an approach would
provide both certainty and flexibility. In this connection it is
noteworthy that the Commission has not seen fit to implement the
Report in the complicated and negative manner suggested by its
draftsmen.42
Assuming that a control relationship does exist between Jones
and C Corporation, a reporting company, the proposed rules would
permit him to sell his shares acquired in a private transaction under
the same conditions as a non-controlling person. 3 In short, he may
sell within the conditions of the "one percent" rule after holding for
one year. Even this holding period does not apply if Jones acquired
his shares in a public offering or in the trading markets. 4 This
proposed rule makes sense, and it is hoped that the Commission will
5
see fit to adopt it in its present form .
What does not make sense, however, is the Report's and the
Commission's proposed treatment of Jones as a controlling person
persons who do not come within its terms are for that reason deemed to be 'in control' of an
issuer." Id.
39. See generally C. ISRAELS, supra note 7; Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional
Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289 (1968); Sommer, Who's "In Controrl7-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw.

559 (1966).
40. See, e.g., S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950).
41. "It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways
in which actual control may be exerted." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
42. Compare proposed rule 160 with WHEAT REPORT app. VI-I, at7 (proposed rule 160).

43. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
44. "Except in [this] one respect, controlling persons and holders of 'restricted securities'
of reporting companies are on much the same footing. There is a difference between them only
if the controlling person acquired his securities in a public offering or in the trading markets.
In that case . . . the securities are not 'restricted securities' and the holding period
requirement in rule 162(b) does not apply." WHEAT REPORT 229-30.

45. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997, at 17-19 (Sept. 15, 1967).
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when C Corporation is a non-reporting company. Under the
proposed rules, absent registration or some exemption, 6 Jones can
never sell through a broker his securities acquired in a private
transaction as long as he remains a controlling person and as long
as C Corporation, or its successor, remains a non-reporting
company."7 It is at once apparent that in at least one respect the
pr'oposed rules would put the controlling shareholder in a less
advantageous position than he now enjoys. As indicated previously,
existing rule 154 may be indirectly available to the controlling
shareholder not engaged in a distribution to enable him to sell his
securities on the open market through a broker within the limitations
of the "one percent" rule."8 Adoption of the proposed rules,
however, would spell loss of this exemption. 9 Does the-distinction
between reporting and non-reporting companies made by the Report
and the Commission really justify this result? With respect to
restraints on alienation, the draftsmen themselves had this to say:
"Perpetual restraints on alienation have been viewed with disfavor
and would create difficulties in the administration of the Act."' ' One
may quarrel, then, with the status of the controlling shareholder
under the proposed rules on the ground that it is actually
inconsistent with the intent of those rules.
It is probable that to avoid this onerous distinction controlling
shareholders will cause their companies to become reporting
companies voluntarily even though the statutory requirements are
not present.5 Desirable as this may seem from the standpoint of
expanded disclosure, it may mean that costs attendant to filing and
reporting such as the expense of annual audits will be borne, at least
indirectly, by minority shareholders who thus will receive less of the
company's earnings in the form of dividends. It is submitted that
existing rule 154 with its stringent limitations provides ample
46. See WHEAT REPORT 226-27; Holland, Public Sale of Control Stock and Private
Investment Stock: The SEC's ProposedNew Rules, 25 Bus. LAW. 1027, 1032 (1970).
47. WHEAT REPORT 226-27. Presumably this result is reached because C Corporation is not
on the "qualified list" as set forth in proposed rule 163 and therefore a public sale by Jones,
absent some exemption, would involve a distnbution within the meaning of section 2(11) as
implemented by proposed rule 162.
48. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
49. Proposed rule 164, which would replace existing rule 154, explicitly extends only to the
"broker's part of the 'brokers' transaction.'" The offeror's part of the transaction would not
be exempt.
50. WHEAT REPORT 189.
51. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.

Vol. 1970:515]

PRI VA TE PLA CEMENTS

protection for investors in the trading markets. 52The proposed rules
are unduly harsh and unwarranted in this respect.
CONCLUSION

Adoption of some of the recommendations proposed by that

important segment of the Wheat Report dealing with private
placements and secondary transactions may produce some harsh
results that might have been avoided through more realistic thinking

on the part of its draftsmen. -But it is easy to criticize. One fact
stands out in clear relief: the investor who acquires his shares in a

private placement will know where he stands. No longer will he be
in doubt concerning how long he must hold and under what

conditions he is free to sell on the open market without registration.
For the first time in the Act's 37-year history there will be objective

standards to guide him. This step forward, long overdue, may be
counted as one of the chief legal and economic gains of the Report.
In this respect, adoption of the Report's recommendations should

represent a welcome innovation to members of the legal and
financial communities.
52. With respect to disposition of shares by controlling persons, Congress has created an
apparent loophole that is not generally known to the legal profession. There is a precept that
the Commission follows which is not explicit in the 1933 Act, namely that the registration
requirements of the Act do not go beyond sales of securities to the general public. Accordingly,
a controlling person acting alone, that is without a broker, may sell his shares to the general
public, and the Commission might be at a loss to regard any of his purchasers as underwriters.
Put another way, if an offering is made directly by the person in control without the use of
selling agents or dealers, it may be an offering by a person other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer and thus be exempt. Applying these principles to the proposed rules, presumably a
controlling person would be able to sell all of his shares directly to the public without
registration. See Schulman, Book Review, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1374, 1379 n.19 (1969). Such
a procedure, however, may be more theoretical than real, since it is unlikely that the
controlling person would be able to sell a large amount of stock without the intervention of
persons whom the Commission could label as underwriters.

